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Vol. 2 No. 2
Friendship Amongst the Self-Sufficient: Epicurus
You desire to know whether Epicurus is
right when, in one of his letters, he
rebukes those who hold that the wise
man is self-sufficient and for that reason
does not stand in need of friendships.
This is the objection raised by Epicurus
against Stilbo and those who believe
that the Supreme Good is a soul which
is insensible to feeling.
                             - Seneca, Epistles 9.11
The hedonist Epicurus enjoins us to live a life of pleasure through the temperance of desire. Not to
seek what is inappropriate for us as mortals, but to enjoy our mortal needs satisfied Epicurus’ whole
philosophy is directed toward the achievement of such a natural self-sufficiency (autarkeia). But
while self-sufficiency is a condition crucial to the entirety of Hellenistic thought, to speak of an
“us” in connection with it is problematic. Epicurus’ withdrawal from society would seem to suggest
that the self-sufficient life, if attainable at all, is lived in isolation, needing nothing from others. Yet
we would hardly esteem a life without friends to be desirable in the least, and neither did the
ancients. Both in Aristotle and throughout the entire Stoic tradition, the philosophy of Epicurus’
day wrestled with the relationship between self-sufficiency and friendship. Thus it should come as
no surprise that within the works and references handed down to us by and about Epicurus there
should occur some mention of friendship; what is startling, however, is Epicurus’ unabashed
advocacy of it. Epicurus is obviously aware of the tension in his position; to be sure, according to
the now-lost letter cited by Seneca above, Epicurus himself charged the Stoics with excluding
friendship from self-sufficiency. This is a flaw in Stoic theory, and for Hellenistic thought this
amounts to a flaw in the Stoic way of life. To avoid a counter charge of hypocrisy, for the accuser
to not fall prey to his own accusation, Epicurus must reconcile self-sufficiency and friendship. And
Epicurus does just this, but not simply to make of friendship a quiver in his bow against the Stoics.
Rather, to be a friend is in our nature, it is what is most natural to our existence. Isolation, solitude,
loneliness, these are the result of adherence to the empty beliefs of society by Epicurus’ account. A
life without friends is a life diseased, pained, and in need of succor. Perhaps it would not be too
much to say that Epicurus advocates self-sufficiency simply as a precondition for friendship. In
order to understand how the self-sufficient (near) gods of Epicurus could ever be friends, it is
necessary first to consider exactly what self-sufficiency means for Epicurus. After this, an
explication of friendship in the transmitted Epicurea will show that while friendship may appear
contra self-sufficiency, for Epicurus it forms the very height of self-sufficiency—the ultimate
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moment in his therapeutics of pain.
The originality of Epicurus’ position is best viewed in its contrast to the Aristotelian and Stoic
attempts to throw a bridge between self-sufficiency and friendship. In each of these cases,
friendship is 1) based on a certain identity between friends, and 2) undertaken out of need or in
consideration of its usefulness. Precisely these criteria, sameness and utility, are the death of
friendship. And while Epicurean friendship will attempt to avoid both of these, it will nonetheless
stand in a peculiar relation to them as well. Before proceeding to friendship as it is lived in the
Epicurean manner, a brief presentation of the competing views of friendship, Aristotelian and Stoic,
is in order.
As is well known, the issue of friendship is addressed at length by Aristotle in his Ethics. Here, the
self-sufficient individual lives a life of study (theôrêtikos bios) in the service of wisdom (sophia),
and this is the happiest life available for a human to lead. Such a person is not without friends
according to Aristotle, but his solution to the problem of self-sufficiency and friendship appears as
something of a modified narcissism. Aristotelian friendship is an egoistic extension of self-love onto
others insofar as they resemble that self; it is a loving of oneself in others.2 Aristotelian friendship
falls squarely within the bounds sketched above:
1) The excellent and virtuous individual needs friends; the self-sufficient life would be incomplete
for Aristotle without their presence. Why does he/she need them? "The excellent person will need
people for him to beneit" (NE 9.9.1169b14). Insofar as generosity is a virtue, the virtuous
individual will express this virtue. Who then better to express it toward than one’s friends?
Especially since, for Aristotle, these must also be virtuous individuals. Benefiting such folks, then,
enables one to make a virtuous expression of generosity toward the people best suited and able to
receive it. By benefiting one’s friends, one expresses a virtue to its fullest, and thereby best benefits
oneself. There is a need of the friend in Aristotle if one is to live a virtuous life.
2) Friendship is based in a sameness between friends. In a fascinating passage of the Ethics,
Aristotle informs his audience that friendship as an expression of concern for another or care for
another is grounded in feelings originally felt towards the self. Friendship is an extroversion of this
originally self-directed feeling out onto others, and its force is stronger or weaker to the extent that
the friend in question more or less resembles this original object of affection, the self:
The decent person, then, is related to his friend as he is to himself, since
the friend is another himself. [NE 9.4.1166a30]
Like seeks like but it would prefer identity, and the friend is liked insofar as he or she mirrors the
self. What is decent about friendship has nothing to do with how it relates to others, because the
very "otherness" of these others is elided and of no consequence to friendship. Friendship does not
expand my horizons of understanding, does not introduce me to differences of culture, class, or
race. What is worthy of friendship in the friend is none of this, but rather how well they repeat what
I know of myself, how easily I may contemplate myself in them.
These two moments of supposed friendship, utility and identity, recur in the Stoic concern for
friendship, extending from the school’s founder, Zeno of Citium, on down to the Romans Epictetus
and Marcus Aurelius some five hundred years later. With the Stoic construal of self-sufficiency as
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the proper performance of one’s part within a whole (rather than as any attempt to be a whole unto
oneself), the place of friendship shifts, but its importance does not.
1) Friendship for the Stoics is an expression of reason. The entire first book of Marcus Aurelius’
Meditations can be read as a thanking of friends and relatives for their exemplary role in the
Emperor’s life. They have provided him in reason and can choose to bring his/her particular share
of reason freely into alignment with nature (kata physin). Through such an act, reason comes into a
knowing relation with itself, and the sage is brought into accord with nature. Reason, perhaps, is
nothing other than this self-reflective movement for the Stoics. Now, insofar as other individuals are
likewise rational agents, the friendship of one rational mind to another is again a knowing
relationship of reason to itself. The Stoic project of being in accord with nature, then, is furthered
by the Stoic’s being a friend. Consequently, the Stoic sage must be a friend in order to fully express
his/her accordance with nature. As with Aristotle, friendship is necessary to fully express one’s
virtue.
2) Friendship is only possible amongst the rational (and therefore virtuous). Diogenes Laertius
notes of Zeno that his book Republic was criticized for presenting the virtuous alone as friends (DL
7.33). And while Epicurus may find friendship possible only among the self-sufficient, what he has
in mind could not be further from the Stoic ideal. This is best seen in Epictetus, who is in
agreement with Zeno four hundred years later. In his lecture "Of Friendship" (Discourses 2.22),
Epictetus considers friendship as only possible when the potential for a confict of interest between
the friends has been removed. Dogs seem to play friendly with one another, Epictetus claims, but
throw a piece of meat between them and you will see how much that friendship is worth. So too
with humans. Any value attributed to an object which is not my own makes for a possible conflict
of interests. Since this item that I value (the valuation is, of course, up to me) is not my own,
because it is inessential to me, this item can be separated from me, taken, stolen, stripped from me,
etc. Worse, it can also become the object of another’s interest as well. Only when my interest is
wholly coincident with my moral purpose (proairesis), which alone is entirely my own, will I come
to value what cannot be taken from me, what is essential to me. In refusing to value what could be
the possible object of an altercation or argument, I am thus ready to befriend another who is in
similar condition, “For then this will be my interest—to keep my good faith, my self-respect, my
forbearance, my abstinence, and my co-operation, and to maintain my relations with other men”
(Discourses 2.22.20-21). In withdrawing all claims to the external world, the Stoic removes the
source of all possible conflict as well. The resultant indifference, however, seems an absence of ill
will, rather than any positive form of friendship.
Despite their differences, Aristotle and the Stoics agree in characterizing the friendship of self-
sufficiency in terms of necessity and identity. The resources are available in the Epicurean corpus
for the reconstruction of a distinctly Epicurean friendship vastly different from these.3 Rather than
securing friendship by necessity within the interiority of identity, Epicurus takes it as an opening of
the self-sufficient individual onto the natural world.
1) I neither need nor need not my friends. Self-sufficiency is considered by Epicurus inseparable
from a certain freedom (eleutheria). And while “The greatest fruit of self-sufficiency is freedom”
(ER 6.77/BVC 77), most savory in this fruit is the pleasure that accompanies freedom from need.
The achievement of this release, however, requires a conversion in how one lives one’s life;
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Epicurus’ treatment of desire is meant to facilitate this change. Epicurus divides desires along two
axes, the necessary/unnecessary and the natural/unnatural: “Of desires, some are natural and
necessary, some natural and not necessary, and some neither natural nor necessary but occurring as
a result of a groundless opinion” (ER 5.29/DL 10.149). Epicurus’ naturalism is evident in the
absence here of any unnatural and necessary desires. There is nothing that one might need that is
not natural; conversely, there is nothing that nature cannot supply to the address of one’s needs.
This amounts to a restatement of the claim that natural existence is self-sufficient. Now Epicurus
does not call his followers to abandon desire ex toto, but only desire in its unnatural and
unnecessary forms. These are desires inappropriate for the mortal, unattainable in principle, or the
result of society’s empty opinions (kenodoxiai). They are desires that know no natural measure, the
desire for fame, for example. How much fame is enough? There is no end to the desire and thus no
possibility for its satisfaction. Such insoluble desires bring with them ever-present pains and pangs
of dissatisfaction; all these are to be excised. To be sure, desire remains, though now only in its
natural forms, both necessary and unnecessary. Epicurus distinguishes the necessary and
unnecessary desires by reference to pain, “The desires which do not bring a feeling of pain when
not fulfilled are not necessary” (ER 5.26/DL 10.148). Natural and necessary desires, the desire to
eat and to drink, for example, bring pain and ultimately death when not satisfied. But it is crucial to
note what this entails: every living being, insofar as it is alive, has already satisfied these natural
and necessary desires to some extent or another. Consequently, the only desires which could trouble
the soul by their unfulfillment are the unnecessary ones (there again being no unnatural and
necessary desires for Epicurus). Epicurus occupies himself most with these. As the unnecessary
desires are precisely that, unnecessary, there is no pain felt at the lack of their object. Unnatural and
unnecessary desires are to be abolished outright, however difficult this may be. But natural and
unnecessary desires are free for the enjoyment, as long as one keeps one’s head in this.4 The empty
opinions of others, however, tend to make of these unnecessary objects luxurious necessities (fine
food and clothing, for example). This makes what should be a matter of free enjoyment into a cause
for concern, and this thereby hinders enjoyment. An inverse relation would seem to pertain between
pleasure and utility, “He who has the least need of tomorrow will approach it with the greatest
pleasure” (ER 149/U 490).
Need obstructs pleasure. But it is not only that the one who has the least need will approach the
world most pleasurably, but rather that the world will be most pleasurable to the one who needs it
least. The transformation is not only in how I approach the world, but in how the world appears to
me as well. Through the treatment of desire, by bringing the soul to a state of satisfaction, Epicurus
simultaneously frees the world from that soul’s utilitarian impositions. The world can now show
itself as something other than a workshop of tools for the satisfaction of needs. Existence in itself is
pleasurable for Epicurus—this is, in effect, the sum of his thought—need obscures this fact, and so
to remove the need is to restore the pleasure. Pleasure is always free, when constrained by need it
is lost, diminished, perverted. The removal of pain (the satisfaction of necessities) is the highest
pleasure for Epicurus because it reveals this natural world denuded of calculated utility. In this
satisfied condition of the soul, the unnecessary pleasures of existence may be freely enjoyed. Best
of all, this life liberated from utility is available to all the living, for necessity has always already
been met. Epicurus’ many claims to rival even Zeus in happiness when provided with a mere barley
cake and some water stem from this conception (DL 10.11; DL 10.131; ER 159/U 602). The
treatment of desire is not performed for parsimony’s sake, but rather, “We have been keen for self-
sufficiency, not so that we should employ inexpensive and plain fare under all circumstances, but
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/mitchell.html[9/18/2009 5:09:05 PM]
so that we can be of good cheer about them” (ER 48/U 135a). Enjoyment is a way of letting the
unnecessary remain unnecessary, of not demanding that the unnecessary always be present, i.e., of
not making of the unnecessary a need. To enjoy is to let things be their own measure and to
withhold from them the standard of utility, to let them go when their time has come. Release from
need is crucial to the project of restoring natural pleasure to the world and humanity.5
But just as the necessary and natural desires constantly recur, making of Epicurus’ thought a way of
life, so too does friendship find itself embroiled with necessity. Friendship is not found in the
avoidance of utility, but in the confrontation with it. Friendship “takes its origin” from benefit and
utility, Epicurus claims in one of the Vatican Sayings, though it is worth choosing for its own sake
(ER 6.23, LS 22F1/BVC 23). The possibility of a friendship being useful—and at the same time, of
a friend being used, or of being used by a friend—is essential to friendship and coeval with it. A
fall into the transactual endangers every friendship, the fragility of which is addressed by Epicurus
through the figure of pistis, belief and confidence, i.e., the promise: “We do not need utility from
our friends so much as we need confidence [pisteôs] concerning that utility” (ER 6.34, LS
22F3/BVC 34). Confidence is the essence of friendship for Epicurus, each friend must both give
and receive the confidence of the others.6 There are three aspects of this phenomenon worth
considering:
a) In giving my word, I promise to keep my word. In promising to the other, in giving the friend
my confidence, I call myself to a responsibility before that other. I promise that I will later be the
same person that I now am, the one who is promising. I promise to remember my promise. But
there would be no promise if every time I gave my word I could not help but keep it. A promise
takes its meaning from the danger that it may not be kept. By giving my word, I hold myself
responsible to the other even if events beyond my control should keep me from holding to my
word. By this act, I put the constancy of myself to the test (a trait admired by Epicurus, see ER
6.39, LS 22F4/BVC 39 cited below), and this constancy is a precondition of friendship.
b) I must believe in my friend. I must believe that my friend may be of benefit to me. But to
believe this is at the same time to believe that I may some day stand in need of such benefaction.
To believe this is to recognize that my self-sufficiency is a performance which must be maintained
at every moment. Even granting my acceptance of the fact that I may one day need a friend, I must
also have the confidence that this friend will be there for me at this unspecified later date, come
what may. I must have faith in their promise. Once again, friendship becomes a question of
responsibility, this time on the part of the friend. And once again the self-sufficient individual seems
dangerously exposed to chance.
c) I must give confidence of my utility. As friendship is a mutual relationship, one must both give
and receive confidence. In my promise, I accept that the friendship about to be entered into may
place me in the position of being useful to another. The danger here is that I may be used or
exploited by the friend in whom I confide. I may be made a tool or a means for their further ends.
Within a philosophy of self-sufficiency such as Epicurus’, being made into an object for another’s
gain is the worst of possible fates and the complete antipode to self-sufficiency; it is life’s greatest
danger.
In the promise of friendship, then, there is a resolution to constancy in the face of chance and
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danger: “one must be willing to run some risks for the sake of friendship” (ER 6.28, LS 22F2/BVC
28). Epicurus opposes the constancy of the true friend (as per point a above) to the two extremes of
friendship’s perversions:
The constant friend is neither he who always searches for utility, nor he who never links
[friendship and utility]. For the former makes gratitude a matter for commercial
transaction, while the latter kills off good hope for the future” (ER 6.39, LS 22F4/BVC
39).
The mutual promise of friendship opens a relationship between the friends in which the inescapable
danger of utility is accepted. In both of the above cases of corrupted friendship there is a
consolidation of friendship along one side of the useful/useless divide. As a consequence, there is
an interruption of the reciprocity that is essential to friendship. In the first case, where utility is
always sought, the friend cannot freely give, nor can I return my gratitude. Here the free act of
friendship (and we should recall the connections between freedom and pleasure) is calculated with
an eye to its benefit and return. When the friendly act is done for expected repayment, my gratitude
is likewise inculpated in this calculable exchange. I no longer freely thank the friend, instead that
thanks is made part of a repayment. In the second case, where friendship is never linked to use, the
friend cannot receive my promise of utility. There is no danger that I might be used by the friend.
The friend does not recognize him/herself as ever possibly being in need. The friend who does not
link friendship to utility has not confronted the danger of ever standing in need or of ever being
needed by another. Such uncontrolled and unaddressed dangers will almost certainly return to
disturb the soul, destroying our good hope for the future. This hope, it should be noted, is felt in
the present. In this second case of false friendship, then, there is no faith expressed between the
supposed friends, and thus no bond of friendship. And in both cases, the reciprocal assumption of a
danger is lost in favor of a more secure and decidedly unfriendly position. Dangers must be faced
and assumed, otherwise troubles may ensue. The maintenance of the danger is central to friendship.
Transcending utility, friendship is neither useful nor useless, but always in danger of becoming one
or the other of these.
2) Friendship individuates. Given that friendship involves a risking of self-sufficiency, there still
remains the problem of sameness to contend with. Are the Epicurean gods of self-sufficiency not, in
some fundamental sense, the same? If the therapy of desire has brought the individual back to a
natural state, free from the empty beliefs of society and liberated from the calculative project of
reason, if the treatment has removed all pain from the body and distress from the soul, what is left
to distinguish one such individual from another? Friendship amongst these folk will be yet another
friendship based in a sameness between the friends. In a very real sense, pain is crucial to identity
—“Name me your relation to pain and I will tell you who you are” one could say.7 Pain
individuates and keeps us from becoming indistinguishably perfect and happy. However, to think
that pain can be wiped out once and for all is ridiculous, hunger and thirst always return and with
them their attendant pains. The belief that the stomach is inexhaustible is a false one, writes
Epicurus (ER 6.59; LS 21G4/BVC 59), yet so too is the belief that once satisfied it will never
hunger again. The self-sufficiency which Epicurus seeks is a natural self-sufficiency, and there is
nothing unnatural about pain. Self-sufficiency must be a way of comporting toward this.
The temptation to see in Epicurus’ work a flight from pain must be resisted. Perhaps his thought is
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best construed in two parts, one destructive and negative, the other, constructive and positive. In the
first and preparatory part, the false beliefs of society and the overdependance upon reason are
attacked. The details of Epicurus’ philosophy here stand as so many curatives to the troubles of the
soul in society; to the apprehensions arising from the thought of a predetermined universe, for
example, Epicurus offers as antidote his counter-notion of the swerve; to the fears of death, the
thought that the latter is nothing to us, etc. In this manner, Epicurus seeks to bring it about that his
followers live lives of completion, untroubled, never desiring more than is appropriate, never
carried away by the empty fears of society.
Whereas in the first stage pain seems the enemy (most commentary remains at this stage), in the
second and positive stage pain is embraced as inalienable from life. Only in friendship is self-
sufficiency first attained, for only in friendship is pain as an argument against the pleasure of life
refuted. This is perhaps what is most Epicurean in Nietzsche as well, the thought that pain is no
reproach for life. The friend accepts nature as both pleasant and painful. Treating our desires, we
eliminate the unnatural ones and carefully choose the unnecessary ones. In this way, our lives are
more complete and full of satisfaction. They become richer within the limits of nature. In this
condition, we are able to properly befriend. Otherwise put, we become poor in desires in order to
become rich by nature so that we may risk our treasury in friendship with the other. In accepting
this risk, we choose to live dangerously, confronting the greatest danger of becoming an object for
another. Friendship is thus a choosing of the pain which makes one who one is, a friend. Insofar as
I am most naturally the self-sufficient individual that I become through friendship with another, my




1. In citing the works of and concerning Epicurus, I have employed a parenthetical citation scheme
(citing first the English translations separated by a slash from the Greek texts) wherein the following
works are cited by the given abbreviations:
For the English:
DL = Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers. [English and Greek text]
ER = The Epicurus Reader: Selected Writings and Testimonia. Trans. and Ed. Brad
Inwood and L..P. Gerson.
LS = The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. I. Trans. and Ed. A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley.
For the Greek:
BVC = Epicurus: The Extant Remains. Trans. and Ed. Cyril Bailey. [Used only for the
“Vatican Collection” of sayings; chapter V.a]
U = Epicurea. Ed. H. Usener.
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Long and Sedley Vol. II presents the original texts for all of LS. Full bibliographical
information for all of the above is available in the bibliography.
2. Gregory Vlastos had questioned whether Platonic love ignored what was particular about the
individual in an appreciation of what was of the ideal in the beloved, the idea of the beautiful, for
example. A similar criticism could be made of Aristotle, what is particular about the individual is
passed over in an appreciation of what is similar to the lover in the beloved. In this Aristotelian
position, then, the self would take the place of the idea. See “The Individual as an Object of Love in
Plato” (Vlastos, 1-34; see especially pages 31-32).
3. Such an endeavor, however, must remain speculative as too little remains of Epicurus’ work to
speak with any great certainty. Nevertheless, this is entirely in keeping with Epicurus’ own doctrine
of inferring from the evident to the non-evident. As long as our suppositions about the role of
friendship in Epicurean life accord with what remains of the Epicurea, our reconstruction can be
said to enjoy a certain validity. And yet this would still be to treat Epicurean thought as a doctrine.
Quite to the contrary, Epicurus’ philosophy is inseparable from its therapeutic deployment. The
beliefs that one would hear Epicurus espouse would vary according to the illness suffered (if you
are not worried sick about the determinism that seems to adhere to all atomisms, then Epicurus need
not speak to you of “the swerve” in atoms). Contradiction is not a damning charge for Epicurus,
because truth stands in the service of life for him. The valuation of life over truth, this is the only
doctrine of Epicurus. Thus while a presentation of Epicurean friendship must rely on the most
skeletal of sources, its true validity will lie in how it helps us understand friendship and be better
friends here and now. Whatever is said must have relevance for today.
4. Laertius reports the Epicurean claim that “Sexual intercourse…never helped anyone, and one
must be satisfied if it has not harmed” (DL 10. 118). Sex would appear to be a natural but
unnecessary desire then, its absence does not necessarily bring pain. But just because it does not
bring help to the individual this is no reason to dismiss it outright. And Epicurus does not do so.
Necessary desires when satisfied necessarily help us, they remove pains. Natural and unnecessary
desires neither help nor hurt us necessarily. Finally, unnatural and unnecessary desires necessarily
hurt us. The intermediate position of the natural unnecessary desires in this context places them at
the center of the Epicurean therapeutics of desire. He does not preach against them, but their
enjoyment may prove too difficult for the novice. To enjoy these unnecessary desires and to not
make of them necessities, to take free pleasure in the unnecessary, this is the highest achievement.
5. Note that while both Aristotle and the Stoics identify friendship as a means to express a virtue
which would otherwise go unexpressed, for Epicurus there is nothing to be gained in friendship.
This is its greatness, pleasure, and, ultimately, virtue. For Epicurus virtue is inseparable from
pleasure (DL 10.138), is for the sake of pleasure and a means to pleasure (ER 12/U 509; ER 19.42,
LS 21L/Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 3.18.42), and to be honored only insofar as it produces
pleasure (ER 37, LS 21M/U 67). In the words of one Epicurean, “I spit upon the honourable and on
those who vainly admire it, whenever it produces no pleasure” (ER 151/U 512).
6. One can glean this importance from the following statement in the Vatican Collection, “The wise
man feels no more pain when he is tortured (than when his friend is tortured, and will die on his
behalf; for if he betrays) his friend, his entire life will be confounded and utterly upset because of a
lack of confidence [apistian]” (ER 6.56-57/BVC 56-57).
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7. Ernst Jünger, Über den Schmerz, in Jünger, 145.
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